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Abstract
In this paper, we develop formal authorization alloca-
tion algorithms for role-based access control (RBAC). The
formal approaches are based on relational structure, and
relational algebra and operations. The process of user-role
assignments is an important issue in RBAC because it may
modify the authorization level or imply high-level confiden-
tial information to be derived while users change positions
and request different roles. There are two types of problems
which may arise in user-role assignment. One is related to
authorization granting process. When a role is granted to a
user, this role may be conflict with other roles of the user or
together with this role; the user may have or derive a high
level of authority. Another is related to authorization revo-
cation. When a role is revoked from a user, the user may
still have the role from other roles.
To solve the problems, this paper presents an authoriza-
tion granting algorithm, and weak revocation and strong
revocation algorithms that are based on relational algebra.
The algorithms can be used to check conflicts and therefore
to help allocate the roles without compromising the security
in RBAC. We describe how to use the new algorithms with
an anonymity scalable payment scheme. Finally, compar-
isons with other related work are discussed.
1. Introduction
Recently, role based access control (RBAC) has been
widely used in database system management and operat-
ing system products. RBAC involves individual users being
associated with roles as well as roles being associated with
permissions (Each permission is a pair of objects and oper-
ations). As such, a role is used to associate users and per-
missions. A user in this model is a human being. A role is
a job function or job title within the organization associated
with authority and responsibility.
Permission is an approval of a particular operation to be
performed on one or more objects. As shown in Figure 1,
the relationships between users and roles, and between roles
and permissions are many-to-many. (i.e. a permission can
be associated with one or more roles, and a role can be as-
sociated with one or more permissions). The security policy
of the organization determines role membership and the al-
location of each roles capabilities.
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Figure 1. RBAC relationship
In 1993, the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) developed prototype implementations, spon-
sored external research [6], and published formal RBAC
models [7, 9]. Many organizations prefer to centrally con-
trol and maintain access rights, not so much at the system
administrator’s personal discretion but more in accordance
with the organization’s protection guidelines [5]. RBAC is
being considered as part of the emerging SQL3 standard for
database management systems, based on their implementa-
tion in Oracle 7 [13]. Many RBAC practical applications
have been implemented [3, 8, 14].
However, there is a consistency problem when using
RBAC management. For instance, if there are hundreds
of roles and thousands of users in a system, it is very dif-
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ficult to maintain consistency because it may change the
authorization level, or imply high-level confidential infor-
mation to be derived when more than one role is requested
and granted.
We develop formal approaches to check the conflicts and
therefore help allocate the roles without compromising the
security. The formal approaches are based on relational
structure, relational algebra, which has a set of complete
and sound axioms. As far as we know, this is the first kind
of work in this area to address the formal approaches for
role allocation and conflict detection.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we identify the problems related to role assignment and re-
vocation. Relational algebra-based authorization granting
algorithm and revocation algorithms are developed in sec-
tion 3. In section 4, we review an anonymity scalable elec-
tronic commerce payment scheme. We then apply the for-
mal authorization approaches to this scheme in section 5.
Comparisons with related work are discussed in section 6
and the conclusions are in section 7.
2. Problem Definitions
With RBAC, users cannot associate with permissions di-
rectly but roles. Permissions must be authorized for roles,
and roles must be authorized for users. The RBAC security
model has two components: MC
0
and MC
1
[14]. Model
component MC
0
, called the RBAC authorization database
model, defines the RBAC security properties for authoriza-
tion of static roles. Static properties of an RBAC authoriza-
tion database include role hierarchy, inheritance, cardinal-
ity, and static separation of duty. MC
1
called the RBAC
activation model, defines the RBAC security properties for
dynamic activation of roles. Dynamic properties include
role activation, permission execution, dynamic separation
of duties, and object access. In particular, the RBAC model
supports the specification of several aspects.
a. User/role associations – the constraints specifying
user authorizations to perform roles;
b. Role hierarchies – the constraints specifying which
role may inherit all of the permissions of another role;
c. Duty separation constraints – these are role/role asso-
ciations indicating conflict of interest:
c1. Static separated duty (SSD) – a constraint specify-
ing that a user cannot be authorized for two different roles;
c2. Dynamic separated duty (DSD) – a constraint spec-
ifying that a user can be authorized for two different roles
but cannot act simultaneously in both;
d. Cardinality – the maximum number of users allowed,
i.e. how many users can be authorized for any particular
role (role cardinality), e.g., only one manager.
A comprehensive administrative model for RBAC must
account for all four issues mentioned above, among oth-
ers. However, user-role assignment is a particularly critical
administrative activity. This is because assigning people to
tasks is a normal managerial function and assigning users to
roles is a natural part of assigning users to tasks. Therefore
this paper will focus on user-role assignment.
Let D be a database with a set of relations REL, a set of
attributes A. REL includes ROLES, USERS, Can-assign,
Can-revoke, SEN-JUN, and Role-User etc. A includes at-
tributes such as RoleName, UserID, UserName etc from the
relations. R
1
is a set of roles R
1
= fr
1
; r
2
; :::; r
n
g; U is a
set of users U = fu
1
; u
2
; :::; u
l
g. Roles are in two cate-
gories, one is administrative roles (admin.role), the other is
regular roles (role) that need to be assigned to or revoked
from users by administrative roles. The roles assigned to
a user by administrators may be in conflicts. For example,
SSD and DSD relationships may not be sympathetic with
the roles associated with the user; on the other hand, be-
cause of role hierarchies, the user may still have the permis-
sions of a role which has been revoked. In the latter case,
the user is able to access objects and has operations on the
objects. The problems arising in processes of assigning and
revocation are evident.
Authorization granting problem – How to check whether
a role is in conflict with the roles of a user?
Authorization revocation problem – How to find whether
permissions of a role have been revoked from a user or not?
For example, Figure 2 shows a system administrative
role ( ShopSO ) in a shop to manage regular roles such as
SELLER, AUDITOR and MANAGER. Role MANAGER
inherits SELLER and AUDITOR. SELLER has a DSD re-
lationship with AUDITOR. The administrative role ShopSO
can assign a user to be AUDITOR or SELLER but not both
simultaneously, otherwise it compromises the security of
the shop system. It is easy to find conflicts between roles
when assigning roles to a user in a small database system
but it is hard to find them when there are thousands of roles
in a system. Our aim is to provide relational algebra algo-
rithms to solve the problems and then automatically check
conflicts when assigning and revoking.
Some relations in set REL are detailed below.
ROLES - This relation has (n+ 1) attributes when there
are n roles.
The first attribute, RoleName is the primary key for the
relation, and represents the name of a role. From the sec-
ond attribute to (n+ 1)th attribute, it describes the state of
conflicts with the RoleName in the relation and its domain
is f-1, 0g, where ‘-1’ means conflicting with the RoleName
and ‘0’ means not.
The ROLES relation in Figure 2 is in Table 1. The at-
tribute SELLERC shows whether the role SELLER is con-
flicting with the RoleName in the relation or not. For in-
stance, in the third tuple, a user with role SELLER has con-
flicts with the role AUDITOR.
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Figure 2. Administrative role and role Rela-
tionships in a shop
RoleName MANAC AUDC SELLERC SHOPC
MANAGER 0 0 0 0
AUDITOR -1 0 -1 0
SELLER -1 -1 0 0
SHOP -1 -1 -1 0
Table 1. The relation ROLES in Figure 1
USERS - This relation has two attributes fUserID, User-
Name g, UserID is the identity of a user and UserName,
which domain is the set of a list of users in the system.
UserID and UserName are recorded for each user. User-
Name is the primary key for the table. For example, there
are two users David and Tony in the system of Figure 2.
The USERS relation is in Table 2.
UserID UserName
0001 David
0002 Tony
Table 2. The relation USERS in Figure 1
Roles are managed by administrative roles. Senior roles
are shown at the top of the hierarchies. Senior roles inherit
permissions from junior roles. Let x > y denote x is senior
to y with obvious extension to x  y.
SEN JUN - This is a relation of roles in a system. Se-
nior is the senior of the two roles. Table 3 expresses the
SEN JUN relationship in Figure 2.
ROLE USER - defines a relationship between USERS
and ROLES fRoleName, UserNameg.
RoleName is a foreign key RoleName in the ROLES. It
explains a role is assigned to a user.
UserName is a foreign key UserName from the USERS.
Suppose MANAGER is assigned to user Tony and
SELLER to user David, Table 4 expresses the ROLE USER
relationship.
Senior Junior
MANAGER AUDITOR
MANAGER SELLER
MANAGER SHOP
SELLER SHOP
AUDITOR SHOP
Table 3. SEN JUN table in Figure 1
RoleName UserName
MANAGER Tony
SELLER David
Table 4. ROLE USER table
It is easy to know a role set associated with a user from
ROLE USER. Therefore, the authorization granting prob-
lem can be changed to whether a role is conflicting with a
set of roles R or not.
3. Authorization granting and revocation algo-
rithms based on relational algebra
We will develop granting and revocation algorithms
based on relational algebra in this section. The notion of a
prerequisite condition, Can-assign and Can-revoke is a key
part in the processes of user-role assignment [15].
A prerequisite condition is an expression using boolean
operators ^ and _ on terms of the form x and x where x
is a role and ^ means “and ”, _ means “or ”. A prereq-
uisite condition is evaluated for a user u by interpreting x
to be true if (9x0  x); (u; x0) 2 UA and x to be true if
(8x
0
 x); (u; x
0
) 62 UA, where UA is a set of user-role
assignments. 
For a given set of roles R let CR denote all possible
prerequisite conditions that can be formed using the roles in
R. Not every administrator can assign a role to a user. The
following relation provides what roles an administrator can
assign with prerequisite conditions.
Can-assign is a relation of  AR  CR  2R, where AR
is a set of administrative roles. 
User-role assignment (UA) is authorized by Can-assign
relation. Table 5 shows the can-assign relations with the
prerequisite conditions in the example.
The meaning of Can-assign
(ShopSO; SHOP; fSELLER;AUDITORg) is that a
member of the administrative role ShopSO can assign a
user whose current membership satisfies the prerequisite
condition SHOP to be a member of roles SELLER and AU-
DITOR. To identify a role range within the role hierarchy,
the following closed and open interval notation is used.
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Admin.role Prereq.Condition Role Range
ShopSO SHOP [SHOP, SHOP]
ShopSO SHOP ^SELLER [AUDITOR, AUDITOR]
ShopSO SHOP ^AUDITOR [SELLER, SELLER]
ShopSO SELLER ^ AUDITOR [MANAGER, MANAGER]
Table 5. Can-assign in the example
[x; y] = fr 2 Rjx  r ^ r  yg
(x; y] = fr 2 Rjx > r ^ r  yg
[x; y) = fr 2 Rjx  r ^ r > yg
(x; y) = fr 2 Rjx > r ^ r > yg
Supposing an administrator role ADrole wants to assign
a role r
j
to a user with a set of roles R. R is an extension
of R, R = fxjx 2 Rg [ fxj9x0 2 R; x0 > xg.
Authorization granting algorithm Grant(ADrole, R; r
j
)
Input: ADrole, a set of roles R and a role r
j
.
Output: true if ADrole can assign role r
j
to R with no
conflicts; false otherwise.
Begin:
Num: = 0
Step 1. /* Whether the ADrole can assign the role r
j
to R or not */
Suppose S
1
= R

\ S
2
where
S
2
= 
Prereq:Condition
(
admin:role=ADrole
(Can  assign))
if S
1
6= ,
then there exists role r 2 S
1
, such that
r
j
2 
RoleRange
(
fADrole;rg
(Can  assign))
go to step 2 /* r
j
is in the range to be assigned
by ADrole in Can-assign */
else
return false and stop. /*the admini.role has no right
to assign the role r
j
to R */
Step 2. /*whether the role r
j
is conflicting with roles in R or not*/
for each role r
i
in R, do
Num
i
= 
r
j
C
(
RoleName=r
i
(ROLES))
/* r
j
C is an attribute that describes conflicting states of r
j
with other
roles */
if Num
i
=  1
r
j
is a conflicting role with R, return false;
if for all r
i
2 R, Num
i
= 0 return true.
/* r
j
is not a conflicting role with R */ 
Theorem 1 The authorization granting algorithm can pre-
vent conflicts when assigning a role to a user.
Admin.role Role Range
ShopSO [Shop, MANAGER)
Table 6. Can-revoke
Proof Assuming an administrator role ADrole wants to as-
sign a role r
j
to a user which associates with a role set R.
While step 1 in the algorithm has checked whether the AD-
role can assign the role r
j
to a user or not, the second step
has decided whether the role r
j
is conflicting with roles in
R or not. Indeed, r
j
can be assigned to the user if for all
r
i
2 R, Num
i
= 0. Otherwise r
j
is a conflicting role with
R. 
The authorization granting problem is solved by
the authorization granting algorithm. Computing
S
1
in the first step takes time proportional to n
if n is presented as the number of roles. Com-
puting 
admin:role=ADrole
(Can   assign) and

Prereq:Condition
(
admin:role=ADrole
(Can   assign))
needs time O(n). Thus, the step 1 takes time O(n2). In the
second step, the computations of 
RoleName=r
i
(ROLES)
and 
r
j
C
(
RoleName=r
i
(ROLES)) spent O(n) and O(1)
respectively. It needs time O(n2) to get Num
i
for all
r
i
2 R. Therefore the total time spent in the authorization
granting algorithm is proportional to n2.
Corollary 1 The authorization granting algorithm has time
complexity O(n2) for the case of n roles in a system.
Now we consider revocation of user-role membership.
Similar to Can-assign relation in granting a role to a user,
there is a Can-revoke relation between administrative roles
and regular roles.
A relation Can  rev ok e AR  2R shows which
role range administrative roles can revoke, where AR is a
set of administrative roles. 
The meaning of Can-revoke
(ShopSO; [Shop;MANAGER)) in Table 6 is that a
member of the administrative role Shop can revoke mem-
bership of a user from any role in [Shop, MANAGER).
Due to role hierarchy, a role x0 has all permissions of role
x when x0 > x. A user with two roles fx0; xg still has the
permissions of x if only to revoke x from the user. The ex-
plicit member of a role x is a set of user fU j(U; x) 2 UAg
and the implicit member of role x is a set of user fU j9x0 >
x; (U; x
0
) 2 UAg. To solve the authorization revocation
problem, we need to revoke the explicit member of a role
first if a user is an explicit member, then revoke the implicit
member.
Following are two algorithms for revocation of a role
r
j
from a set of roles R by an administrative role ADrole,
where R is a set of roles which are assigned to a user. The
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first one is weak revocation algorithm and another one is
strong revocation algorithm. The weak revocation only re-
vokes explicit membership from a user and does not revoke
implicit membership but the strong revocation revokes both
explicit and implicit members.
Weak revocation Algorithm Weak revoke(ADrole,R, r
j
)
Input: ADrole, a set of roles R and a role r
j
.
Output: true if ADrole can weakly revoke role r
j
from R;
false otherwise.
Begin:
if r
j
=2 R,
return false; /* there is no effect with the operation of the weak revocation
since the user is not an explicit member of r
j
*/
else /* The user with the role set R is an explicit member of r
j
*/
1. if r
j
2 
RoleRange
(
admin:role=ADrole
(Can revoke)),
return true; /*the user’s explicit membership in r
j
is revoked */
2. if r
j
=2 
RoleRange
(
admin:role=ADrole
(Can revoke)),
return, false. /* ADrole has no right to revoke the role r
j
from the
user */ 
We have the following result with the weak revocation
algorithm.
Theorem 2 A role r
j
is revoked by the weak revocation
algorithm Weak revoke(ADrole; R; r
j
) if the user is an
explicit member of role r
j
and the ADrole has the right to
revoke r
j
from the Can-revoke relation. 
It takes time O(n) to check if r
j
=2 R when
there are n roles in a system. The computa-
tions of 
admin:role=ADrole
(Can   revoke) and

RoleRange
(
admin:role=ADrole
(Can   revoke)) take
time O(n). To check whether
r
j
2 
RoleRange
(
admin:role=ADrole
(Can  revoke))
needs time O(n). Thus, the time complexity of the Weak
revocation algorithm is O(n).
Corollary 2 Weak revocation algorithm has time complex-
ity O(n) when there are n roles in a system.
A user still has permissions of a role which has been
weakly revoked if a role associated with the user seniors the
role revoked. To solve the authorization revocation prob-
lem, we need strong revocation which requires revocation
of both explicit and implicit membership. Strong revoca-
tion of a user’s membership in x requires that the user be
removed not only from explicit membership in x, but also
from explicit and implicit membership in all roles senior to
x. Strong revocation therefore has a cascading effect up-
wards in the role hierarchy.
Strong revocation algorithm Strong revoke(ADrole, R,
r
j
)
Input: ADrole, a set of roles R and a role r
j
.
Output: true, if it can strong revoke role r
j
from R; false
otherwise.
Begin:
if r
j
=2 R

,
return false; /* there is no effect of the strong revocation since the user is
not an explicit and implicit member of r
j
*/
else,
1. if r
j
2 R, do Weak revoke(ADrole, R, r
j
);
/*r
j
is weakly revoked from R*/;
2. Suppose
Sen = R

\ 
Senior
(
Junior=r
j
(SEN   JUN)),
for all y 2 Sen, do Weak revoke(ADrole, R, y);
/*the user is weakly revoked from all such y 2 Sen*/.
If all the weak revocations are successful,
return true;
otherwise, return false. 
It should be noted that Weak revoke(ADrole, R, r
j
) and
Weak revoke(ADrole, R, y) do not work if ADrole has no
right to revoke r
j
. We have the following consequence.
Theorem 3 The explicit and implicit member of role r
j
are
revoked from the user by the Strong revocation algorithm
Strong revoke(ADrole; R; r
j
) if the ADrole has the right
to revoke r
j
from the Can-revoke relation.
Corollary 3 The authorization revocation problem is solved
by the Weak revocation algorithm and Strong revocation al-
gorithm.
It needs O(n) to check whether r
j
=2 R
 if there are n
roles in a system. The computations of 
Junior=r
j
(SEN 
JUN) and 
Senior
(
Junior=r
j
(SEN JUN)) takes time
proportional to m where m is the number of tuples in the
relation SEN-JUN and m < n. It takes time proportional
to n  m to compute Sen. Other operations r
j
2 R, r
j
weak revocation and y 2 Sen takes time O(n). Therefore
the total time spent with the Strong revocation algorithm is
O(n
2
).
Corollary 4 The Strong revocation algorithm has time com-
plexity O(n2) when there are n roles in a system.
In the remaining parts of this paper, the new relational
algebra approaches will be used with a payment scheme.
We review the payment scheme first.
4. Review of the anonymity scalable electronic
payment scheme
Algorithms will be used in a consumer anonymity scal-
able payment scheme. The payment scheme provides dif-
ferent degrees of anonymity for consumers. Consumers
can decide the levels of anonymity. They can have a low
level of anonymity if they want to spend coins directly after
withdrawing them from the bank. Consumers can achieve
a high level of anonymity through an anonymity provider
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(AP) agent without revealing their private information and
are secure in relation to the bank because the new certificate
of a coin comes from the AP agent who is not involved in
the payment process. The scheme is briefly reviewed below
[18].
Electronic cash has sparked wide interest among cryp-
tographers ([12, 20, 10, 17], etc.). In its simplest form, an
e-cash system consists of three parts (a bank, a consumer
and a shop) and three main procedures withdrawal, pay-
ment and deposit. Besides the basic participants, a third
party named anonymity provider (AP) agent is involved in
the scheme. The AP agent will help the consumer to get the
required anonymity but will not be involved in the purchase
process. The model is shown in Figure 3. The AP agent
gives a certificate to the consumer when s/he needs a high
level of anonymity.
withdrawal
depositpayment
anonymity
scalability
AP AGENT
CONSUMER
SHOP
BANK
Figure 3. Electronic cash model
From the viewpoint of banks, consumers can improve
anonymity if they are worried about disclosure of their
identities. This is a practical payment scheme for Inter-
net purchases because it has provided a solution with dif-
ferent anonymity requirements for consumers. However,
consumers cannot get the required level of anonymity if the
role BANK and AP are assigned to a user. It means the man-
agement of the payment scheme is an important issue. To
simplify the management of the scheme and prevent errors
in the user-role assignment, we will analyze its management
with the relational algebra algorithms.
5. Applications of the relational algebra algo-
rithms
The new relational algebra algorithms will be applied to
the payment scheme in this section. We first consider the
relationships of the roles in the scheme, then analyze appli-
cations of the relational algebra algorithms.
5.1 Duty separation constraints
There are two types in duty separation constraints. One
is SSD and another one is DSD. In Figure 4, for example,
CONSUMER EMPLOYEE
VISITOR
 SSD DSD
Indicates inheriting relationship
Indicate SSD and DSD relationships respectively
DSD DSD DSD
SHOP  BANK
 SSD  SSD
      AP 
Figure 4. The relationships of the roles in the
scheme
since all staff in the AP agent, the bank and the shop are
employees, their corresponding roles inherit the employee
role. The role AP, SHOP and BANK have DSD relation-
ships with the role CONSUMER. This indicates that an
individual consumer cannot act the roles of AP, SHOP or
BANK simultaneously. The staff in these three participants
have to first log out if they want to register as consumers.
For example, a consumer, who is a staff member of the AP
agent and is able to act the role AP, can ask the AP agent to
help him to get a coin with a high level anonymity. But as a
consumer, s/he cannot give herself/himself a new certificate
of a coin when s/he works for the AP agent. Another staff
member of the AP agent should do the job for this person.
The role AP has an SSD relationship with BANK. This
is because the duty of the AP is to help a consumer to get
a coin with a high level of anonymity. The BANK knows
the old coin and its certificate. The AP sends the new cer-
tificate of the new coin to the consumer. The role BANK
will know the new certificate and new coin if the same staff
member from the AP agent and the bank processed the coin
for the consumer. If this occurs, the consumer cannot have
a coin with the required anonymity because the BANK has
known the new coin. The SHOP also has an SSD relation-
ship with the BANK since the BANK verifies the payment
as well as depositing the coin to the shop’s account. The
SSD relationship is also a conflict of interest relationship
like the DSD relationship but much stronger. If two roles
have a SSD relationship, then they may not even be autho-
rized to the same individual. Thus, the role AP, BANK, and
SHOP may never be authorized to the same individual.
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5.2 An application of the authorization granting
algorithm
A hierarchy of roles and a hierarchy of administrative
roles are shown in Figure 6 and Figure 5 respectively. Ta-
ble 7 shows the Can-assign relations with the prerequisite
conditions in the scheme and Table 10 shows ROLES re-
lationship (the attribute M1C, for example, shows whether
the role M1 is conflicting with the RoleName in the relation
or not).
Let us consider the APSO tuples in Table 7 (the analysis
for BankSO and ShopSO are similar). The first tuple autho-
rizes APSO to assign users with the prerequisite role FPS
into members in the AP agent (AP). The second one autho-
rizes APSO to assign users with the prerequisite condition
FPS ^ OP to be quality controllers (QC). Similarly, the
third tuple authorizes APSO to assign users with the pre-
requisite condition FPS ^ QC to be operators (OP). The
second and third tuple show that the APSO can grant a user
who is a member of the AP agent into one but not both of
QC and OP. This illustrates how mutually exclusive roles
can be forced. However, for the NSSO and SSO these are
not mutually exclusive. The fourth tuple authorizes APSO
to put a user who is a member of both QC and OP into a
manager (M1). Of course a user could have become a mem-
ber of both QC and OP only by actions of a more powerful
administrator than APSO.
Admin.role Prereq.Condition Role Range
APSO FPS [AP, AP]
APSO FPS ^OP [QC, QC]
APSO FPS ^QC [OP, OP]
APSO QC ^ OP [M1, M1]
BankSO FPS [Bank, Bank]
BankSO FPS ^TE ^AU [AC, AC]
BankSO FPS ^TE ^ AC [AU, AU]
BankSO FPS ^AU ^ AC [TE, TE]
BankSO TE ^AU^ AC [M2, M2]
ShopSO FPS [Shop, Shop]
ShopSO FPS ^SELLER [AUDITOR, AUDITOR]
ShopSO FPS ^AUDITOR [SELLER, SELLER]
ShopSO SELLER ^ AUDITOR [M3, M3]
NSSO FPS (FPS, DIR)
SSO E [FPS, FPS]
SSO FPS (FPS, DIR]
Table 7. Can-assign relation in the scheme
Assume Bob is a user with role FPS. The administrative
role NSSO wants to assign the role AP to Bob. Using the
granting algorithm Grant(NSSO, FPS, AP), the first step,
R

= R = fFPSg and

Prereq:Condition
(
Admin:role=NSSO
(Can  assign)) = fFPSg;
then
R

\ 
Prereq:Condition
(
NSSO
(Can  assign)) 6= :
This means NSSO can assign role AP to Bob. The second
step, based on Table 10,
Num = 
APC
(
RoleName=FPS
(ROLES)) = 0
It means no conflicts when assigning AP to Bob.
5.3 Application of the authorization revocation al-
gorithm
Table 8 and Table 9 give the Can-revoke and a part of
senior-junior relationship of the payment scheme.
Admin.role Role Range
APSO [AP, M1)
BankSO [Bank, M2)
ShopSO [Shop, M3)
NSSO (FPS, DIR)
SSO [FPS, DIR]
Table 8. Can-revoke of the payment scheme
AP Security Officer
(APSO) (BankSO)
Bank Security Officer
(ShopSO)
Shop Security Officer
New  System  Security Officer (NSSO)
Senior Security Officer (SSO)
Figure 5. Administrative role assignment in
the scheme
Suppose Bob is an explicit member of M1, QC, AU,
AUDITOR, AP, FPS and E in the payment scheme.
If Alice, with the activated administrative role APSO,
weakly revokes Bob’s membership from AP, the revo-
cation is successful by the weak revocation algorithm
Weak revoke(APSO, R, AP),
R = fM1; QC;AU;AUDITOR;AP; FPS;Eg;
AP 2 
RoleRange
(
Admin:role=APSO
(Can  revoke)):
However, he continues to be a member of the senior roles to
AP since both M1 and QC are senior roles to AP, there-
fore he can use the permission of AP. It is necessary to
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Senior Junior
FPS E
OP AP
QC AP
M1 OP
M1 QC
M1 AP
Director M1
Table 9. A part of SEN-JUN relation of the pay-
ment scheme
note that Alice should have enough power to weakly re-
voke Bob’s membership from his explicitly assigned roles.
For instance, if Alice has activated APSO and then tries to
weakly revoke Bob’s membership from M1, she is not al-
lowed to proceed because APSO does not have the author-
ity of weak revocation from M1 according to the can-revoke
relation in Table 8.
Therefore, if Alice wants to revoke Bob’s explicit mem-
bership as well as implicit membership from AP by weak
revocation, she needs to activate SSO and weakly revoke
Bob’s membership from AP, QC and M1. This brings about
the same result as strong revocation from AP by SSO. How-
ever, Alice does not need to revoke Bob’s membership from
FPS, AU, AUDITOR and E, because they are not senior
roles to AP based on the role hierarchy of Figure 6.
For example, Bob is an explicit member of M1, QC, AU,
AP, AUDITOR, FPS and E. If Alice with the activated ad-
ministrative role SSO strongly revokes Bob’s membership
from AP, then he is removed not only from explicit mem-
bership in AP, also from explicit and implicit membership
in all roles senior to AP. Using the strong revocation algo-
rithm Strong revoke(SSO, R, AP),
R = fM1; QC;AU;AP;AUDITOR;FPS;Eg
R

= fM1; QC;OP; AU;AP;Bank;AUDITOR;FPS;Eg
Step 1, role AP is revoked from R since AP is an explicit
member.
Step 2,
Sen = R

\ 
Senior
(
Junior=AP
(SEN   JUN))
= fM1; QCg:
This means Bob has been removed from M1, QC as well
as AP after the strong revocation from AP. However, he still
has a membership of FPS, AU, AUDITOR and E, since they
are not senior roles to AP based on the role hierarchy of Fig-
ure 6. This brings out the same result as the one after weak
revocation from AP, QC, M1 by SSO. Note that all implied
revocations upward in the role hierarchy should be within
the revocation range of the administrative roles that are ac-
tive in a session. For instance, if Alice activates APSO and
tries to strongly revoke Bob’s membership from M1, she is
not allowed to proceed because M1 is out of the APSO’s
can-revoke range in Table 8.
6. Related work
There are several other related works on role-based ac-
cess control models [1], user-role assignment mechanisms
developed for web-based intranets [16], Oracle system [2]
and relational databases [11].
A role-based separation of duty language (RSL 99) has
been recently proposed [1]. It has given a formal syntax
and semantics for RSL99 and has demonstrated its sound-
ness and completeness by using functions on conflicting
role sets. The proposal is different from ours in two as-
pects. First, It does not consider the case of the manage-
ment for conflicting roles. Therefore, there is no support to
deal administrative roles with regular roles in the proposal.
By contrast, our algorithms provide a rich variety of op-
tions that can deal the document of administrative roles with
regular roles. Second, the algorithm RSL99 does not pro-
vide access control models. It only gives separation of duty
(SOD) policies. By contrast, we present a number of spe-
cialized authorization algorithms for access control which
allow administrators to authorize a role to users or revoke a
role from users.
The interaction between RBAC and relational databases
are presented in [11]. Two experiments are described. One
is a role-based front end to a relational database with discre-
tionary access control. Another one is a role graph to show
the roles in a standard relational databases. Some relational
concepts like roles, users and permissions etc are provided.
Our model also support such concepts even though it has
a large variety. However, the main difference between our
algorithms and the scheme in [11] is, we focus on the so-
lutions of the conflicts of roles and the latter focuses on
the correlation of RBAC with discretionary access controls.
Their work discusses the relationship between roles and dis-
cretionary access controls, they did not address how to allo-
cate roles to users without conflicts. In our work, we devel-
oped detailed algorithms for allocating roles and checking
the conflicts.
User-role assignment is also discussed in Oracle system
by using SQL[2]. RBAC skills are partly used in [2]. Per-
missions can be assigned to users directly in Oracle system
but not in our work. Another difference between our work
and the work in Oracle system is in revocation process. We
have demonstrated the weak revocation and the strong re-
vocation that depend on different revocation requirements.
However, the revocaton in [2] is as follows:
If you revoke a role to which other roles have been
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Bank
New system (FPS)
Employee (E)
AUDITOR(AU) TELLER (TE)
MANAGER(M2)
ACCOUNT_REP
(AC)
DSDSSD AUDITOR(AU3)
They are
 employees
The Manager inherits the Operator
AP agent:
and Quality controler. Auditor, they are employees.  The Saler
The manager inherits the Saler and the 
has DSD relationship with the Auditor.
Shop
QUALITY
DSD
   CONTROLER(QC) OPERATOR(OP) DSD
ShopAP agent(AP)
MANAGER(M1)
 MANAGER(M3)
  
SELLER
Director (DIR)
:
they are  employees.  The Account_rep has DSD relatonships 
The Manager inherits the Teller, Auditor and  Account_rep, 
Bank:
with  the Teller,  SSD relationship with the Auditor.
Figure 6. User-role assignment in the payment scheme
RoleName EC FPSC APC QCC OPC M1C BaC TEC ACC AUC M2C ShC SAC AU3C M3C DiC
E 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
FPS 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
AP 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1
QC 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1
OP 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1
M1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1
Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1
TE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1
AC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1
AU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 -1
M2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
Shop 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1
SELLER 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 -1 -1 -1
AUDITOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 0 -1 -1
M3 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1
Director 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 10. ROLES in the payment scheme
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granted, the entire set of privileges associated with every
role will be revoked. Of course, if any of those roles and
privileges had been granted directly to a user or a role af-
fected by the revoke, they can still exercise the related priv-
ileges through the direct grant. page 302.
Finally, a user-role assignment for web-based intranet
has been proposed in [16]. In such a model, the RBAC/web
system with user-role assignment model (URA97) [15] is
extended to decentralize the details of RBAC administration
on the web. Authorizations can be given by administrators
through prerequisite conditions. However, our work sub-
stantially differs from that proposal. Differences are due to
the consistency problem arises in [16]:
It is very difficult to keep the consistency by reflecting se-
curity requirements between global network objects and lo-
cal network objects if there are hundreds of roles and thou-
sands of users in a system.
This problem is completely overcome in our algorithms
because the algorithms focus on the conflicts between roles.
The authorization granting algorithm is used to find con-
flicts and prevent some secret information to be derived
while the strong revocation algorithm is used to check
whether a role still has permissions of another role.
7. Conclusions
This paper has provided new authorization allocation
algorithms for RBAC that are based on relational alge-
bra operations. They are the authorization granting algo-
rithm, weak revocation algorithm and strong revocation al-
gorithm. The algorithms can automatically check conflicts
when granting more than one role to a user in a system.
They can prevent users from accessing unauthorized use of
facilities when users change position within the organiza-
tion and demand the modification of security rights. The
roles can be allocated without compromising the security in
RBAC and provide secure management for systems. The
complexities of the algorithms are also analyzed. Further-
more, we have reviewed the consumer scalable anonymity
payment scheme and discussed how to use the algorithms
for the electronic payment scheme.
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